Secret US and Afghanistan Talks Could See Troops Stay for Decades
Russia, China and India concerned about 'strategic partnership' in which Americans would remain after 2014
by Jason Burke
American and Afghan officials are locked in increasingly acrimonious secret
talks about a long-term security agreement which is likely to see US troops,
spies and air power based in the troubled country for decades.
Though not publicised, negotiations have been under way for more than a
month to secure a strategic partnership agreement which would include an
American presence beyond the end of 2014 - the agreed date for all 130,000
combat troops to leave - despite continuing public debate in Washington and
among other members of the 49-nation coalition fighting in Afghanistan about
the speed of the withdrawal.
American officials admit that although Hillary Clinton, the US secretary of
state, recently said Washington did not want any "permanent" bases in
Afghanistan, her phrasing allows a variety of possible arrangements. . . .
There are at least five bases in Afghanistan which are likely candidates to
house large contingents of American special forces, intelligence operatives,
surveillance equipment and military hardware post-2014. . . .
Gen. David Petraeus: We Can't Leave Afghanistan Now, They Have Trillions of Dollars of Minerals, YouTube, August 16, 2010
[In sum, the SCO continues to insist that it does not aspire to be a "NATO
of the East" or a military alliance. On the other hand, it is set on making
NATO (and Pax Americana) simply irrelevant to an entire landmass, which with
the induction of India and Pakistan will account for more than half of
mankind.
. . . It now becomes the common position of Russia, China and the Central
Asian states that they disfavor the establishment of any permanent US and/or
NATO military presence in Afghanistan.
The SCO declaration comes at a time when the US is actively discussing a
strategic partnership agreement with the government headed by President
Hamid Karzai. Thus, it is a point of interest that Karzai himself was at
Astana when the SCO declaration was formally approved.--M K Bhadrakumar,
"SCO
steps out of Central Asia," atimes.com, June 18, 2011]
[Asserting that the country that served as a launching pad for the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks no longer represented a
terrorist threat to the United States, Mr. Obama, in remarks prepared for
delivery at 8 p.m. from the East Room of the White House, announced plans to
withdraw 10,000 troops from Afghanistan by the end of this year. The
remaining 20,000 troops from the 2009 "surge" of forces would leave by next
summer, amounting to about a third of the 100,000 troops now in the
country.--Helene Cooper and Mark Landler, "Obama
Orders Troop Cuts in Afghanistan," nytimes.com, June 22, 2011]
[The lesson from that bogus history is that the United States should remain
in Afghanistan indefinitely because to depart prematurely would invite
greater danger in the future.
It may be understandable why neoconservatives would push such malarkey - and
why Defense Secretary Gates and other government hardliners would be tempted
to use the made-up chronology to convince gullible journalists about the
need to stay the course - but their "history" is a fabrication (as Gates
well knows).
The simple truth is that the last end game in Afghanistan was messed up not
because the United States left too soon but because it stayed too
long.--Robert Parry, "The
Lie Behind the Afghan War," consortiumnews.com, June 24, 2011]
[The sound of that Chinook CH-47 transport helicopter shot down by a
Taliban rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) in Wardak province, southwest of
Kabul, on Friday, killing 38 people - including 19 US Navy SEALs and seven
Afghan commandos - was the full digital sound of the empire being shocked
and awed into disbelief, no matter Pentagon efforts to practically order the
media "not to read too much" into the crash.
Wardak - along with neighboring Logar - is now prime Talibanistan real
estate. They are entrenched, know the terrain in detail and even have time
to prepare complex operations. On top of it, the Taliban are "making
progress" (Pentagon jargon) not only in their public relations skills and in
adapting new weapons to the battlefield, but also in the mechanics of
delivering a major psychological blow to the Western occupying forces. . . .
It's astonishing (or maybe not) that the Washington power elite simply does
not register how the empire was mercilessly downgraded by the Taliban over
this past month. The Taliban killed President Hamid Karzai's half-brother,
drug lord and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) asset Ahmad Wali. They
killed people at his funeral. They killed Karzai's head of tribal relations
and a member of parliament. And they killed the mayor of Kandahar, Ghulam
Hamidi.--Pepe Escobar, "US shocked
and awed by the Taliban," atimes.com, Aug 10, 2011]
[America and Afghanistan are close to signing a strategic pact which would
allow thousands of United States troops to remain in the country until at
least 2024--Ben Farmer, "US troops may stay in
Afghanistan until 2024," atimes.com, Aug 19, 2011]
[His list of why "the grand strategy" is a total wreck is also long:
getting in with no thought of getting out; lack of consistency and
continuous mission creep; disunity of military and political commands;
governing an unruly Western military by a civilian ineptness that did not
know "the difference between a tornado and a torpedo"; diverting resources
to Iraq; unwillingness to co-opt the neighbors; poor choice of local allies
who became more of a problem than a solution; relying on self-centered
military in a vacuum of indigenous institutions for development; and what
can be stated as "hubris hovering above misery", not his words, to create a
corruption-prone environment: the $125 billion annual expenditures by the
Empire, dwarfed but not uplifted the $800 million self-generated revenue of
the Afghan state while the American Generals were free to dole out $750
million annually -- that total lopsidedness in cash-disbursement nourished
the "narco-mafias whom the Taliban originally targeted when they took power
in the mid-1990s." "Most tragically of all," he adds, was the hasty
intervention and not waiting for the outcome of the jirga, summoned by the
Taliban in October 2001, "to decide how to respond to American demands that
Osama bin Laden and those responsible for the 9/11 be handed
over."--Abderrahman Ulfat, "Comments on
'Cables From Kabul' By Ambassador Sherard Cowper-Coles," The Wisdom
Fund, August 24, 2011]
[The American rhetoric often spoke of a Great Central Asia strategy aimed at
rolling back Russian and Chinese influence in that region by bringing it
closer to the Indian market. By deciding instead to work with Russia and
China and the Central Asian countries within a regional framework, India has
made a significant policy decision. The diplomatic challenge now will be to
put in place the underpinning to galvanise India's economic ties with
Central Asia once the SCO membership gains traction. This underpinning
principally involves robust ties with Iran and pressing ahead imaginatively
with the normalisation process with Pakistan.--M K Bhadrakumar, "Getting
the regional act together," thehindu.com, August 27, 2011]
[United States Special Operations Forces (SOF) have been increasingly aiming
their night-time raids, which have been the primary cause of Afghan anger at
the US military presence, at civilian non-combatants in order to exploit
their possible intelligence value, according to a new study published by the
Open Society Foundation and The Liaison Office.--Gareth Porter, "US night
raids 'aimed at Afghan civilians'," atimes.com, September 22, 2011]
[Ten years ago, . . . Recognising defeat, the Taliban wanted to talk peace:
a formal surrender, the transfer of vehicles and weapons, an end to fighting
in Kandahar, all in return for assurances their leaders could be able to
return to their villages. That night Obaidullah sent bread for Karzai, in a
gesture of conciliation.
In retrospect, it was a tantalising opportunity for a smooth post-Taliban
transition and, perhaps, a novel political dispensation. But it wasn't to
be. Furious after the 9/11 attacks, the US war machine pursued the Taliban
hard. Karzai, the new leader, acquiesced. And the Taliban leadership slunk
across the border into Pakistan to lick their wounds and plan the resurgence
that is racking the country today.--Declan Walsh, "Afghanistan is losing time for a peaceful solution
- and the Taliban know it," Guardian, October 6, 2011]
[After ten years of war costing at least $450 billion, 1,600 dead and 15,000
seriously wounded soldiers, the US has achieved none of its strategic or
political goals.
Each US soldier in Afghanistan costs $1 million per annum. CIA employs
80,000 mercenaries there, cost unknown. The US spends a staggering $20.2
billion alone annually air conditioning troop quarters in Afghanistan and
Iraq.
The most damning assessment comes from the US-installed Afghan leader, Hamid
Karzai: America's war has been "ineffective, apart from causing civilian
casualties."
Washington's goal was a favorable political settlement producing a pacified
Afghan state run by a regime totally responsive to US political, economic
and strategic interests; a native sepoy army led by white officers; and US
bases that threaten Iran, watch China, and control the energy-rich Caspian
Basin.
All the claims made about fighting "terrorism and al-Qaida," liberating
Afghan women and bringing democracy are pro-war window dressing. CIA chief
Leon Panetta admitted there were no more than 25-50 al-Qaida members in
Afghanistan. Why are there 150,000 US and NATO troops there?
Washington's real objective was clearly defined in 2007 by US Assistant
Secretary of State Richard Boucher: to "stabilize Afghanistan so it can
become a conduit and hub between South and Central Asia - so energy can flow
south."
The Turkmenistan-Afghan-Pakistan TAPI gas pipeline that the US has sought
since 1998 is finally nearing completion. But whether it can operate in the
face of sabotage remains to be seen.--Eric Margolis, "Afghanistan: Ten Years of Aimless
War," ericmargolis.com, October 8, 2011]
[Loya jirgas are called rarely - fewer than 20 have been held in the past
300 years of Afghan history. And they were probably never called to sanctify
the bonding of an Afghan ruler with a foreign power. . . .
Karzai can now claim he has a mandate from the Afghan nation even if
parliament were to refuse to ratify the Afghan-US strategic pact.--M K
Bhadrakumar, "Karzai
skates on thin ice," atimes.com, November 22, 2011]
[Therefore, when Mohaqiq speaks to Reuters, it merits attention. No one
knows the true colours of the Taliban better than he would. And no one has
higher stakes than him in the forthcoming peace talks with the Taliban. . . .
There is much to be said in favour of the initiative taken by US congressman
Dana Rohrabacher. A parliamentary system based on proportional
representation provides the check and balance preventing an outright Taliban
takeover.--M K Bhadrakumar, "An agenda for Afghan peace talks," rediff.com,
February 1, 2012]
[I witnessed the absence of success on virtually every level. . . .
A January 2011 report by the Afghan NGO Security Office noted that public
statements made by U.S. and ISAF leaders at the end of 2010 were "sharply
divergent from IMF, . . . 'strategic communication' messages suggesting
improvements. We encourage [nongovernment organization personnel] to
recognize that no matter how authoritative the source of any such claim,
messages of the nature are solely intended to influence American and
European public opinion ahead of the withdrawal, and are not intended to
offer an accurate portrayal of the situation for those who live and work
here."--Daniel L. Davis, "Truth, lies and
Afghanistan: How military leaders have let us down,"
armedforcesjournal.com, February 2012]
[The final document is likely to be short on specifics. . . . In
Afghanistan, the agreement will have to be approved by parliament.--Heidi
Vogt, "US, Afghanistan reach deal on strategic pact," google.com,
April 22, 2012]