Standard Schaeffer, "'Al Qaeda Itself Does Not
Exist'," CounterPunch, June 21, 2003
"Pakistan Launches Air Strikes in Swat
Valley," VOA News, May 7, 2009
Dexter Filkins, "U.S. Pullout a Condition in
Afghan Peace Talks," New York Times, May 21, 2009
Kirsty Walker, "Afghan War Could Last 'For
Decades'," Daily Mail, August 3, 2009
Syed Saleem Shahzad, "A New Battle Begins in
Pakistan," Asia Times, October 20, 2009
[The Afghan Taliban are fighting the foreign occupation of their country,
and the Pakistani Taliban have decided to fight against local people in
their own country and occasionally take on the Pakistani military. So, that
is a very big difference between the two. The Afghan Taliban are trying more
and more to win people to their cause, which means that the way they operate
has to be different from what it used to be. In Pakistan the groups calling
themselves the Tehriq eTaliban Pakistan are largely trying to teach the
military a lesson and carry out revenge for what they've seen has been done
against them.--Mara Ahmed and Judith Belo, "Pakistan and the
Global War on Terror: An Interview with Tariq Ali,"
counterpunch.org, November 30, 2009]
[ . . . sending additional forces will delay the day when Afghans will take
over, and make it more difficult, if not impossible, to bring our people
home on a reasonable timetable.-- "Ambassador Eikenberry's Cables on U.S. Strategy in
Afghanistan," New York Times, November 2009]
TRANSCRIPT: "REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT TO
THE NATION ON THE WAY FORWARD IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN,"
whitehouse.gov, December 1, 2009
Declan Walsh, "Turbulent Pakistan presents a conundrum for Barack
Obama: Anti-US feeling running high as CIA drones take a civilian toll,"
Guardian, December 2, 2009
Juan Cole, "Top Ten things that Could Derail Obama's Afghanistan
Plan," juancole.com, December 2, 2009
[ . . . the real costs for the individual taxpayer could peak anywhere from
$400 to $600 annually for the next couple of years--Laurent Belsie, "What Obama's Afghan war plan will cost
you," csmonitor.com, December 3, 2009]
[ . . . we would see the Soviet Army securing Kabul and the largest cities
of Afghanistan, abandoning the vast areas of mountain and desert to the
"terrorists", insisting that they could support a secular, uncorrupt
government in the capital and give security to the people. By the spring of
1980, I was watching the Soviet military stage a "surge". Sound familiar?
The Russians announced new training for the Afghan army. Sound
familiar?--Robert Fisk, "This strategy has been tried before - without success,"
Independent, December 3, 2009]
Scott Shane, "C.I.A.
to Expand Use of Drones in Pakistan," New York Times, December 4, 2009
Todd Wilkinson, "Key to Afghan crisis:
tea and education," csmonitor.com, December 4, 2009
Syed Saleem Shahzad, "US takes
hunt for al-Qaeda to Pakistan," Asia Times, December 5, 2009
[Broadly speaking, just about everyone understands that the US surge of
30,000 additional troops in Afghanistan is a passing necessity. It merely
provides the gateway to an end-game strategy aimed at ensuring American
power doesn't get bogged down in a pointless quagmire in the Hindu Kush.--M
K Bhadrakumar, "Obama treads
Soviet road out of Kabul," Asia Times, December 7, 2009]
Eric Margolis, "Preaching peace, flexing muscle: America's 'surge' may
only expand, intensify and prolong the Afghan conflict," Toronto
Sun, December 7, 2009
DIAGRAM: Richard Engel, "SO
WHAT IS THE ACTUAL SURGE STRATEGY?," MSNBC, December 2, 2009
[The Taliban offer, included in a statement dated December 4 and e-mailed to
news organizations the following day, said the organization had "no agenda
of meddling in the internal affairs of other countries and is ready to give
legal guarantees if foreign forces withdraw from Afghanistan".--Gareth
Porter, "US silent on Taliban's al-Qaeda offer," Asia Times, December
17, 2009]
[At present, there are 104,000 Department of Defense contractors in
Afghanistan. According to a report this week from the Congressional Research
Service, as a result of the coming surge of 30,000 troops in Afghanistan,
there may be up to 56,000 additional contractors deployed. But here is
another group of contractors that often goes unmentioned: 3,600 State
Department contractors and 14,000 USAID contractors. That means that the
current total US force in Afghanistan is approximately 189,000 personnel
(68,000 US troops and 121,000 contractors). And remember, that's right now.
And that, according to McCaskill, is a conservative estimate. A year from
now, we will likely see more than 220,000 US-funded personnel on the ground
in Afghanistan.--Jeremy Scahill, "Stunning Statistics About the War Every
American Should Know," rebelreports.com, December 17, 2009]
[ . . . to be just, a war's cause must be to vindicate an undoubted and
internationally recognized crime; all peaceful means (negotiations) must
have been tried in vain; the good to be done must clearly outweigh the evil
that will be done by the war; there must be reasonable hope that in the end
justice can be achieved for both sides; the means are licit (weapons must be
limited and legitimate); and international law must be observed. By these
criteria, I don't see any just wars anywhere these days.--William Pfaff, "The Fallacy of
Good vs. Evil in Afghanistan," Chicago Tribune, December 18, 2009]
Marjorie Cohn, "Obama's Af-Pak
War Is Illegal," truthout.org, December 21, 2009
[The lessons of history are never clear, and it is risky to predict the
future. The British and the Russians won their wars but failed to impose
their chosen leaders and systems of government on the Afghans. The western
coalition already has as many troops in Afghanistan as the Russians did, and
smarter military technology. But neither the British prime minister nor the
generals have explained to us convincingly why we should succeed where the
Russians and the British failed, or why fighting in Afghanistan will prevent
home-grown fanatics from planting bombs in British cities. Tactics without
strategy indeed.--Rodric Braithwaite, "The familiar road to failure in Afghanistan," Financial Times,
December 21, 2009]
[The Taliban have created a shadow "government-in-waiting," complete with
Cabinet ministers, that could assume power if the U.S.-backed government of
Afghan President Hamid Karzai fails--Thomas L. Day and Jonathan S. Landay,
"U.S.
intelligence: 'Time is running out' in Afghanistan," McClatchy
Newspapers, December 28, 2009]
[This week marks the 30th anniversary of the fateful decision, little noted
at the time, that drew the US into its Afghanistan quagmire.--Stephen
Kinzer, "The moment that changed Afghanistan: The problems
ailing Afghanistan began with America's decision to intervene in the country
following the Soviet invasion in 1979," Guardian, December 28, 2009]
[The more we recognize that today drugs are a major factor in both the
economy and the power structure of Afghanistan, the more we must recognize
that an even better template for the Afghan war is not the Vietnam war,
where drugs were important but not central, but the CIA's drug-funded
undeclared war in Laos, 1959-75.--Peter Dale Scott, "Obama
and Afghanistan: America's Drug-Corrupted War," globalresearch.ca,
January 1, 2010]
Joshua Frank, "The War on
Afghanistan's Environment: Bombing the Land of the Snow Leopard,"
counterpunch.org, January 7, 2010
Thomas L. Day, "U.S. oversight
officials say corruption in Afghanistan goes both ways," McClatchy
Newspapers, January 12, 2010
Ayaz Gul, "UN: Civilian Death Toll in Afghanistan
Last Year Highest Since 2001," voanews.com, January 13, 2010
VIDEO: Steve Coll's book Ghost Wars talks about the debate that went
on in the National Security Council about linking up with the Northern
Alliance, because they argue that Massoud was a drug trafficker. It became
very obvious with the UN statistics out of Afghanistan for the year
2001 - that was the season when the Taliban banned the growth of poppy. . . .
the only provinces that grew opium that year were up in the northeast
because they were under the control of the Northern Alliance.--"New mindset for US foreign policy,"
therealnews.com, January 31, 2010
[Americans are furious that Karzai is steadily disengaging from the US's
grip and seeking friendship with China and Iran.--M K Bhadrakumar, "Karzai's
China-Iran dalliance riles Obama," atimes.com, March 30, 2010]
[Having armed all sides of the conflict and kept them apart by the threat of
arms, the United States now expects to depart leaving in place governments
of national reconciliation that will persuade well-armed and well-organized
militias to play by the rules. It is perhaps the silliest thing an imperial
power ever has done. The British played at divide and conquer, whereas the
Americans propose to divide and disappear.--Spengler, "General
Petraeus' Thirty Years War," Asia Times, May 4, 2010]
[ . . . what they found most disturbing about what Prince said was that
Prince told a story of July 2009 where his narcotics interdiction unit, a
200-person strike force in Afghanistan that I had never heard of this force
before, they actually were operating near the Pakistan border, they came
across with a said was a massive hashish and heroin operation and Blackwater
forces actually called-in air strikes that then came in and destroyed this
facility. The idea that a private company is individually calling-in air
strikes raises serious questions about the chain of command issue in
Afghanistan.--"EXCLUSIVE: Secret
Recording of Erik Prince Reveals Previously Undisclosed Blackwater
Ops," democracynow.org, May 4, 2010]
[The longer-than-expected effort to secure Marja is prompting alarm among
top American commanders that they will not be able to change the course of
the war in the time President Obama has given them.--Rajiv Chandrasekaran,
"'Still a long way to go' for U.S. operation in
Marja, Afghanistan," Washington Post, June 10, 2010]
[What about the 9/11 Commission? Its entire report is based on the
assumption that bin Laden was behind the attacks. However, the report's
evidence to support this premise has been disowned by the Commission's own
co-chairs, Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton.