by Standard Schaeffer
An Interview with Historian R.T. Naylor
There really is no relationship between Al Qaeda and the Afghan
opium trade. That is because Al Qaeda itself does not exist, except
in the fevered imaginations of neo-cons and Likudniks, some of whom,
I suspect, also know it is a myth, but find it extremely useful as a
bogeyman to spook the public and the politicians to acquiesce in
otherwise unacceptable policy initiatives at home and abroad. By
those terms, Al Queda is cast like "the Mafia" and similar nonsense
coming from police lobbies. This is a complex issue but, putting it
very simply, what you have in both cases is loose networks of
likeminded individuals--sometimes they pay homage to some patron
figure who they may never have met and with whom they have no
concrete relationship. They conduct their operations strictly by
themselves, even if they may from time to time seek advice.
In other words, if any line of communication does exist, it is
initiated from the people on the ground "upwards" to the presumed
patriarch--not the other way around. Of course, from time to time
some father-figure, if he really exists, might dish out some cash to
some would-be followers or sycophants or hangers-on. But the notion
that there is a firm "money trail" used so much in cop discourse,
and now hijacked by the national security establishment, is foolish.
And the idea that attacking the money trail is the best way to curb
either crime or terrorism is a pure fantasy. This follow-the-money
stuff has been shown time after time to be useless when it comes to
"organized crime" (another stupid term) where the motive is
supposedly profit. Therefore how much more so when it comes to
"terrorism" where money is not a motive, but merely one among many
instruments, and where in any case most actions are actually quite
cheap to pull off. The reality is, for "terrorist" actions, the most
important resource is commitment and that is something which cannot
be frozen in a bank account.
. . . the US is targeting these [Islamic] charities selectively.
It has made no moves against the Jewish fundamentalist "charities"
who have been funding terrorist groups in Occupied Palestine, and
indeed inside the U.S. It has made no serious moves I can think of
against Hindu fundamentalist charities who may be (it is certainly
worth a close look) sending money to the groups responsible for the
mass murder of Muslims in India. . . .
[Your brothers in Palestine and in the land of the two Holy Places are
calling upon your help and asking you to take part in fighting against the
enemy --your enemy and their enemy-- the Americans and the Israelis. they
are asking you to do whatever you can, with one own means and ability, to
expel the enemy, humiliated and defeated, out of the sanctities of
Islam.--"BIN
LADEN'S FATWA: Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the
Land of the Two Holy Places," Al Quds Al Arabi, August 1996]
[Every piece of evidence I came across in my own work contradicted
this notion of al-Qaeda as an "Evil Empire" with an omnipotent
mastermind at its head. Such an idea was undoubtedly comforting -
destroy the man and his henchmen and the problem goes away - but it
was clearly deeply flawed. As a result the debate over the
prosecution of the ongoing "war on terror" had been skewed.
Instead of there being a reasoned and honest look at the root causes
of resurgent Islamic radicalism the discussion of strategies in the
war against terror had been almost entirely dominated by the
language of high-tech weaponry, militarism and eradication.
One question remained, and remains, largely unanswered: what is
al-Qaeda? The word itself is critical. Al-Qaeda comes from the
Arabic root qaf-ayn-dal. It can mean a base, such as a camp or a
home, or a foundation. It can also mean a precept, rule, principle,
maxim, formula or method. . . .
Abdullah Azzam, the chief ideologue of the non-Afghan militants and
a spiritual mentor of bin Laden] was talking about a mode of
activism and a tactic, not talking about a particular organisation.
Indeed it would be a year or more before bin Laden formed his group.
Azzam was using the word to denote a purpose, an ideal and a
function. He, and subsequently bin Laden too, saw the role of
al-Qaeda, the vanguard, as being to radicalise and mobilise those
Muslims who had hitherto rejected their extremist message. . . .
Bin Laden's group was formed with the aim of rousing Muslims,
through active campaigning or "propaganda by deed", to create an
"international army" that would unite the umma or world Islamic
community against oppression. The group was small, comprising not
more than a dozen men, and there was little to distinguish it from
the scores of other groups operating, forming and dissolving in
Pakistan, Afghanistan and elsewhere in the Islamic world.
. . . claims of any links between Saddam and al-Qaeda were based on
a fundamental misconception of the nature of modern Islamic
militancy.
. . . This ideology, a composite of the common elements of all the
various strands of modern Islamic radical thought, is currently the
most widespread, and the fastest growing, element of what makes up
the phenomenon currently, and largely erroneously, labelled
"al-Qaeda". . . .
In the weeks immediately following the tragedy of September 11th there was a genuine interest in
understanding: why?. Why "they" hate us, why "they" were prepared to kill
themselves, why such a thing could happen. That curiosity has dwindled and
is being replaced by other questions: how did it happen, how many of "them"
are there, how many are there left to capture and kill. Anyone who tries to
"explain" the roots of the threat now facing all of us, to answer the "why",
to elaborate who "they are", risks being dismissed as ineffectual or
cowardly. To ask "why" is to lay oneself open to accusations of lacking the
moral courage to face up to the "genuine" threat and the need to meet it
with force and aggression. Many characterise this threat, dangerously and
wrongly, as rooted in a "clash of civilizations."--Jason Burke, "Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror," Guardian, July 13, 2003]
[Burke's thesis is that a basic misunderstanding about the nature of al-Qaeda is
hampering efforts to deal with it. In Arabic, al-Qaeda is simply an abstract noun,
meaning network or base. Far from being a disciplined, structured terrorist
organisation, Burke believes it barely exists. It is merely a very small, amorphous hard
core of violently nihilistic Islamists who have married bin Laden's financial resources
with an ability to tap the skills and support of a vast and diverse network of freelance
Islamic radicals.--William Dalrymple, "Who
is the real enemy?," theguardian.com, July 20, 2003]
[Al-Qaeda is not a traditional terrorist organisation. It does not
have a clear hierarchy, military mindset and centralised command. At
best, Al-Qaeda is a network of affiliated groups sharing religious
and ideological backgrounds, but which often interact sparingly.
Al-Qaeda is a state of mind, as much as an organisation; it
encompasses a wide range of members and followers who can differ
dramatically from each other.--Dr Andrew Silke, "Profiling terror," Janes, August 7, 2003]
[Al-Qaeda is not a terrorist group; it's an insurgency that is
extraordinarily well structured in terms of succession for leadership.--"Q&A with 'Anonymous'," USA Today, July 18, 2004]
VIDEO 1,
VIDEO 2,
VIDEO 3:
Wherever one looks for this al-Qaeda organisation, from the mountains of Afghanistan
to the "sleeper cells" in America, the British and Americans are chasing a phantom
enemy.--Adam Curtis, "The
Power of Nightmares," BBC2, January 14, 2005
[Shortly before his untimely death, former British Foreign Secretary Robin
Cook told the House of Commons that "Al Qaeda" is not really a terrorist
group but a database of international mujaheddin and arms smugglers used by
the CIA and Saudis to funnel guerrillas, arms, and money into
Soviet-occupied Afghanistan.--Pierre-Henri Bunel, "Al
Qaeda -- the Database," Global Research, November 20, 2005]
[Al-Qaeda is not only attempting to destabilise the western world, but the
whole of the stagnated Middle East.--Abdel Bari Atwan, "Total
war: Inside the new Al-Qaeda," Sunday Times, February 26, 2006]
Craig Whitlock, "Architect of New War on the West: Writings Lay Out
Post-9/11 Strategy of Isolated Cells Joined in Jihad," Washington
Post, May 23, 2006
[The reality, as we have learned since . . . is that al-Libi made up that
story of Iraq connections, probably because he was tortured by the Egyptians
(or possibly Libyan intelligence officers who worked with them). But there's
even more to this strange tale that hasn't been revealed. According to Numan
bin-Uthman, a former fellow jihadi of al-Libi's who has left the movement
and is based in London, al-Libi was never a member of Al Qaeda at
all.--Michael Hirsh, "The Myth of Al
Qaeda: Before 9/11, Osama bin Laden's group was small and fractious. How
Washington helped to build into a global threat," Newsweek, June 28, 2006]
[During the Reagan administration, Osama, who belonged to the wealthy Saudi
Bin Laden family was put in charge of raising money for the Islamic
brigades. Numerous charities and foundations were created. The operation was
coordinated by Saudi intelligence, headed by Prince Turki al-Faisal, in
close liaison with the CIA. The money derived from the various charities
were used to finance the recruitment of Mujahieen volunteers. Al Qaeda, the
base in Arabic was a data bank of volunteers who had enlisted to fight in
the Afghan jihad. That data base was initially held by Osama bin
Laden.--Michel Chossudovsky, "Pakistan
and the 'Global War on Terrorism'," Global Research, January 8, 2008]
[Robin Cook, a former British MP and Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote that
Al-Qaeda, "literally 'the database', was originally the computer file of the
thousands of mujahideen who were recruited and trained with help from the
CIA to defeat the Russians." Thus, "Al-Qaeda" was born as an instrument of
western intelligence agencies. This account of al-Qaeda was further
corroborated by a former French military intelligence agent, who stated
that, "In the mid-1980s, Al Qaida was a database," and that it remained as
such into the 1990s. He contended that, "Al Qaida was neither a terrorist
group nor Osama bin Laden's personal property," and further: "The truth is,
there is no Islamic army or terrorist group called Al Qaida. And any
informed intelligence officer knows this."--Andrew Gavin Marshall, "The
Imperial Anatomy of Al-Qaeda: The CIA's Drug-Running Terrorists and the 'Arc
of Crisis'," Global Research, September 5, 2010]
[Al-Qa'ida is an idea rather than an organization, and this has long been the case. For
a five-year period after 1996, it did have cadres, resources, and camps in Afghanistan,
but these were eliminated after the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001.--Patrick Cockburn,
"Why Washington's
War on Terror Failed," tomdispatch.com, August 21, 2014]
[Special Operations forces, now at almost 70,000 and growing. . . . our secret "warriors" now
outnumber the military contingents of major nations.--David Vine and Tom Engelhardt, "Enduring Bases, Enduring War in the Middle
East," tomdispatch.com, January 15, 2016]
[Michael Scheuer ... CIA's Chief of the Bin Laden Issue Station ... Washington's enemy
is an enemy that doesn't exist. It didn't exist when Bin Laden was alive, it doesn't
exist now.--Arjun Walia, "Chief of The CIA's 'Bin-Laden' Unit
Tells The World That Al-Qaeda Never Existed," collective-evolution.com,
May 30, 2016]