LONDON--'Death in the Air' was made in the course of 1999 by British film-maker
Damien Lewis. This 27-minute long programme claimed to be an
investigation of the use of chemical weapons within southern Sudan by
Government of Sudan forces. It concluded that it had produced
"compelling" evidence for its assertions.
In the documentary Lewis outlined the reason for his trip into southern
Sudan: "The...task is to take samples from the alleged chemical weapons
attack for analysis by the World's top experts - at the UK's Chemical
and Biological Defence Agency and at VERIFIN, the equivalent agency in
Finland." The word "chemical" was used 44 times in the programme. "Gas"
is also mentioned several times, as is "poisoning" and "[c]ontaminated".
"War crime" is also mentioned. Damien Lewis asserted in his programme
that: "The results of the analysis by the UK and Finnish chemical
weapons agencies provides tantalising evidence..." He further states:
"Experts say the evidence so far is compelling" and said that there is
"[a] convincing body of evidence."
Given that in reality Lewis was demonstrably unable to produce a shred
of evidence to substantiate a single one of his claims, 'Death in the
Air' is perhaps no better example of irresponsible, sensationalist
television journalism regarding Sudan (with the possible exception of
Lewis's other material on Sudan, programmes such as his 1998 'Exporting
Evil: Saddam's Hidden Weapons' (1) ). The dozens of samples he
theatrically produced in the course of his programme were subsequently
subject to detailed, vigorous independent testing by chemical weapons
agencies of his choosing in two countries: there was not the slightest
trace of anything remotely indicative of the use of chemical weapons.
Claims of involvement with, let alone the use of, weapons of mass
destruction such as chemical agents are amongst the most serious that
can be levelled at any individual or entity. Extreme caution should be
exercised in making such claims - especially with regard to Sudan. It is
not the first time that false claims alleging Sudanese involvement with
weapons of mass destruction have been made. In August 1998, the United
States government launched a cruise missile attack on the al-Shifa
medicines factory in Khartoum, claiming that the factory produced
chemical weapons. The Clinton Administration failed to produce any
evidence, and blocked any subsequent United Nations inspection of the
factory. Independent tests carried out on the factory by a distinguished
American chemist showed no traces of anything associated with chemical
weapons. (2) It is now accepted that the attack was a disastrous
blunder by the American government.(3)
We strongly urge anyone interested in media accuracy, press
sensationalism and misinformation in general, and with regard to Sudan
in particular, to read the transcript of the programme and compare it
against the results of the tests conducted which were central to the
claims made within it. The entire transcript of the programme is
available at http://www.phoenix-tv.net/html/orange/recent/sudanche1.htm
A Poor Track Record for Facts
It should be noted from the start that Lewis has a track record of
making almost unbelievably elementary mistakes about Sudan. In
'Exporting Evil: Saddam's Hidden Weapons', for example, he referred to
southern Sudan as being "largely Christian". This is a particularly odd
mistake for someone such as Lewis to have made, given that he claims to
have visited and reported from Sudan on several occasions. The Economist
Intelligence Unit's 'Sudan: Country Profile 1994-95', for example,
records that Christians account for 15 percent of the southern
population. This figure is carried in Human Rights Watch Africa's 1996
report on Sudan. (4) The definitive United States government guide,
'Sudan A Country Study', also states: "In the early 1990s possibly no
more than 10 percent of southern Sudan's population was Christian." (5)
Independent, standard references thus state that Christians account for
between 10 and 15 percent of the population of southern Sudan. It is
believed that Muslims account for between 12-14 percent of the southern
population. By far the majority of southerners are neither Christian nor
Muslim, and are adherents of native animist religions. It would be
similar to Mr Lewis claiming in a programme about Ireland or the United
Kingdom that Northern Ireland is largely Roman Catholic or that the
Republic of Ireland was largely Protestant. It was a mistake repeated in
'Death in the Air''s own marketing material in 2000 - which refers to
"Christian rebels". (6) We include this as it demonstrates a scant
respect for facts.
Questionable Sources and Questionable Commentators
There was no attempt or apparent desire on the part of Lewis to offset
the customary use of propaganda in war, and particular civil war. This
conflict has been fought for several decades, most recently between the
Khartoum government and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). The
slant of the programme was immediately apparent. Lewis's choice of
interviewees and commentators could not have been more partisan -
starting with the SPLA itself which appears to have initiated the making
of the programme. In its description of "Death in the Air", the Rory
Peck Awards themselves stated, for example, that Lewis has "built up a
working relationship" with the SPLA, and that they asked him to
investigate the use of chemical weapons in southern Sudan.
It should be noted that considerable caution ought to have been
exercised from the outset with regard to SPLA claims. Dr Peter Nyaba, an
SPLA national executive, in his book 'The Politics of Liberation in
South Sudan: An Insider's View', has spoken candidly of what he
describes as the SPLA's "sub-culture of lies, misinformation, cheap
propaganda and exhibitionism": "Much of what filtered out of the SPLM/A
propaganda machinery, notably Radio SPLA, was about 90% disinformation
or things concerned with the military combat, mainly news about the
fighting which were always efficaciously exaggerated." (7) A question
unconsidered by Lewis is whether self-serving allegations of the use of
chemical weapons might fall into the 90 percent of SPLA "disinformation"
as described above?
Lewis also chose to feature Baroness Cox, the president of Christian
Solidarity Worldwide, as a commentator. In considering Baroness Cox's
reliability on Sudan, it is worth nothing that even in Andrew Boyd's
sympathetic biography of her, 'Baroness Cox: A Voice for the
Voiceless', Dr Christopher Besse of Medical Emergency Relief
International (Merlin), a humanitarian aid organisation with which Cox
is closely associated (Dr Besse and Baroness Cox are both trustees of
Merlin), is quoted as saying:
"She's not the most popular person in Sudan among the humanitarian aid
people. She has her enemies, and some of them feel she is not well-
enough informed. She recognizes a bit of the picture, but not all that's
going on." (8)
Lewis cannot have been unaware of the controversy surrounding Cox's
credibility on Sudanese affairs. On issue after issue her accuracy has
been found to be wanting. Her claims about Sudan have been contradicted
by the British and American governments, UNSCOM and human rights groups
such as African Rights, Anti-Slavery International and prominent
southern Sudanese anti-government leaders such as Bona Malwal - all of
whom hostile to the Khartoum authorities. Even 'The Times' newspaper has
described her as "ever so slightly unhinged".(9)
Baroness Cox's track record of making other unreliable claims concerning
Sudan is a clear one. On 17 February 1998, in the British Parliament,
for example, she claimed that four hundred Scud missiles (including
support vehicles well over one thousand vehicles) had been secretly
transferred to Sudan from Iraq since the Gulf War in the face of
unprecedented satellite, electronic and physical surveillance of that
country by the UN, the United States and other concerned members of the
international community. It is a matter of record that Reuters reported
that on the same day that Baroness Cox made this claim, the White House,
no friend of Sudan's, clearly stated: "We have no credible evidence
that Iraq has exported weapons of mass destruction technology to other
countries since the (1991) Gulf War."
The British government stated in relation to these claims that: "We are
monitoring the evidence closely, but to date we have no evidence to
substantiate these claims...Moreover, we know that some of the claims
are untrue...".(10) The British Government Minister also cited UNSCOM,
stating that: "Nor has the United Nations Special Commission reported
any evidence of such transfers since the Gulf War conflict and the
imposition of sanctions in 1991." (11) We mention this in some detail
as Lewis allowed Baroness Cox to once again repeat much the same sort of
unfounded allegations in the programme.
Lewis also featured members of Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) in his
programme despite the fact that this organisation is an openly partisan
supporter of the SPLA rebels. It is a matter of record that NPA
immediately echoed SPLA claims about "chemical" warfare, stating in
August 1999 that NPA "have confirmed beyond doubt earlier reports that
the government of Sudan used chemical bombs against the civilian
population of the towns of Lainya and Kaya on the 23 July 1999".(12)
The fact is that the activities of Norwegian People's Aid has long been
of concern to some of its donors. The Norwegian government had
previously commissioned an independent investigation into NPA. The
subsequent report stated that NPA "has taken a clear side in the war. It
supports the causes of SPLA/M...NPA's solidarity approach means that in
practice the activities of NPA are closely related to the political and
military strategies of the rebel movement." (13) Amazingly, Lewis
presented a NPA nurse as "confirming" that there had been a use of
"chemical" weapons - despite the fact that the nurse is working for a
partisan support rebel solidarity group and that, in the light of the
test results, her expertise as a chemical weapons expert is all too
questionable.
The Test Results
At the heart of the programme's credibility - and that of Lewis himself
- is his claim that "[t]he results of the analysis by the UK and Finnish
chemical weapons agencies provides tantalising evidence..." and that
"[e]xperts say the evidence so far is compelling".
Even a cursory examination of what the British and Finnish chemical
weapons agencies actually said unambiguously contradicted the claims
made in 'Death in the Air'. The Finnish laboratories stated: "Analysis
of the gloves, control soil sample and one water sample, revealed no
relevant chemicals. Analysis of all soil samples and one water sample
revealed the presence of 2,4,6-trinitrotoluene (TNT). In addition to
TNT, one soil sample contained the following degradation products of
TNT: 1,8-dinitronaphtalene, 1-nitronaphtalene and
1,5-dinitronaphthalene." That is to say, no evidence of any chemical
weapons. There was, however, evidence that a conventional bomb had gone
off.
The British government's chemical and biological defence agency at
Porton Down rigorously tested seventeen samples of water, soil and
shrapnel provided by Lewis for the spectrum of known chemical agents. In
the government's response, the British Minister of State for Defence
Procurement stated that "very careful analysis of all the available
evidence" led the government to "conclude that there is no evidence to
substantiate the allegations that chemical weapons were used in these
incidents in the Sudan." More of Lewis's samples were independently
tested in the United States. The minister also stated with regard to
these and other samples that "a separate set of samples taken from the
sites of the alleged CW attacks in the Sudan was tested independently in
the US. The results of these tests also indicated no evidence of
exposure to CW agents. I understand that Mr Lewis also passed samples to
the Finnish institute responsible for chemical weapons verification
("VERIFIN") and I am advised that this analysis likewise found evidence
of TNT but none for CW agents." In fact, the British government remarked
on "the consistency of results from these three independent sets of
analysis". The British government reiterated its findings in October
2000, when, specifically referring to Lewis's claims, they once again
stated that "there was no evidence to substantiate the allegations that
chemical weapons were used in Sudan. (14)
Mr Lewis also chose not to mention that a United Nations medical team
had also travelled to the area in which it was claimed the chemical
weapons attack took place. A Spokesman for the United Nations Secretary-
General stated that this medical team had:
"gathered medical samples (blood and urine) from 13 of the 35 people who
had reported symptoms. The samples were sent for analysis to the Centre
for Disease Control (CDC), an independent laboratory in Atlanta."
The United Nations further stated that:
"The results...as reported to the United Nations, indicated no evidence
of exposure to chemicals." (15)
Yet despite all the unambiguously negative test results on soil, water,
shrapnel, blood, urine and glove samples, Mr Lewis somehow found the
courage to claim in his programme that these tests provided "tantalising
evidence...", that "[e]xperts say the evidence so far is compelling" and
that there is "[a] convincing body of evidence." It is for the readers
of this study to draw their own conclusions about Mr Lewis's credibility
and ethics as a reporter.
It is also worth noting that Lewis spent several minutes in the
programme describing symptoms he presented as being caused by a chemical
weapons attack. The VERIFIN report stated: "The health hazards described
in literature for TNT and its degradation products, match quite well
with the symptoms described by the victims." That is to say that Lewis
was describing symptoms consistent with the use of standard explosives.
Damien Lewis, and presumably the "independent team of US & British
military experts" that accompanied him, were apparently unable to
identify the effects of conventional explosives, let alone chemical
weapons.
The 2000 Rory Peck Awards
Amazingly, 'Death in the Air' was a finalist in 2000 in the prestigious
British Rory Peck Awards for freelance film-making, with the judges
stating: "This piece shows determination and stamina in getting the
story - he has obviously built up contacts and come out with good
evidence". Lewis may well have shown determination and stamina; and he
is self-evidently a good story-teller, but the simple fact is that the
evidence by which the programme stands or falls is simply non-existent.
It is a matter of record that Lewis added to his documentary in July
2000 and that the deadline for entries for the 2000 award was July 2000.
Lewis would have been aware of all the negative test results back by
early June - results which comprehensively invalidated the entire thesis
of his programme. Despite having the opportunity, Lewis did not draw the
judges' attention to the fact that all of the independent agencies that
examined his "evidence" found nothing to support his allegations.
Instead he persisted in claiming "tantalising", "compelling" and
"convincing" evidence when there was quite clearly no such thing.
If a scientist or doctor had been party to such a shoddy, and
dangerously inept piece of work - publishing, for example, a paper
claiming a great medical breakthrough on the basis of tests which
subsequently proved to show no such thing - and seeking to claim a prize
for doing so - he or she would probably be suspended from his profession
or possibly even struck off the medical register. Amazingly enough, in
making it through to the finals of the Rory Peck award, rather than
shunning such a questionable piece of work the British freelance film
industry appears to have actually embraced this programme. The judges
for the 2000 Rory Peck Awards were either misled or their standards in
judging the award were remarkably slapdash.
Conclusion
'Death in the Air' is not just an indictment on Lewis's professionalism,
but a disservice to British reporters and film-makers in general and,
given that the programme was actually short-listed as a finalist in the
Rory Peck awards, a particular disservice to those awards. Given this
sort of unprofessional and blatantly propagandistic output it is perhaps
little wonder that Western journalists and film-makers are sometimes
viewed with suspicion within parts of the developing world.
'Death in the Air' was ultimately a huge non-story. But it nonetheless
succeeded as a piece of sensationalist propaganda. The media has a
responsibility to the truth. This was certainly not evident in 'Death in
the Air'. Nor was it seemingly present in the 2000 Rory Peck Awards.
Appendices and Notes
Appendix 1:
The Report of the Finnish Institute for Verification of the
Chemical Weapons Convention (16)
"Analysis of Samples from Sudan
Helsinki 20 June 2000.
On 1 November 1999, VERIFIN received eight samples delivered
by Mr. Damien Lewis, an independent journalist. Based on
information provided by him to VERIFIN, the samples were
collected on 17 August 1999 near the town Lainya in South
Sudan. The village had been bombarded and local people
assumed that chemicals, e.g. riot control agents, had been
spread over the village. Health hazards experienced by the
local people were described on a video. Photographs from the
site were also shown. According to information given to
VERIFIN, chain-of-custody procedures were followed from
sample taking to their transportation for analysis. The
samples consisted of 4 soil samples, 2 water samples, gloves
used for packing of the samples, and a control soil sample.
The samples were coded in the presence of a courier.
The samples were prepared and analysed by following the
Recommended Operating Procedures used by VERIFIN in the OPCW
Proficiency Tests. In addition to detecting the chemicals
included in the Schedules of the Chemical Weapons
Convention, due to the reported symptoms of the victims,
special emphasis was given to detecting arsenic-containing
and other chemicals known to have been used as riot control
agents or a method of warfare.
Screening of the samples was performed using gas
chromatography with nitrogen-phosphorous sensitive detector
(GC/NPD), gas chromatography- electron impact/mass
spectrometry (GC-EI/MS) and liquid chromatography-
atmospheric pressure chemical ionization mass spectrometry
(LC-APCI/MS).
Identification of the chemicals was obtained with two
different spectrometry techniques, gas
chromatography-electron impact/mass spectrometry (GC-EI/MS)
and liquid chromatography-atmospheric pressure chemical
ionization/tandem mass spectrometry (LC-APCI/MSMS). The
estimated concentrations of the chemicals in the samples
were based on analysis using GC/EI/MS. Specific laboratory
tests were performed to seek clarification to the different
colours found in the samples.
Analysis of the gloves, control soil sample and one water
sample, revealed no relevant chemicals. Analysis of all soil
samples and one water sample revealed the presence of
2,4,6-trinitrotoluene (TNT). In addition to TNT, one soil
sample contained the following degradation products of TNT:
1,8-dinitronaphtalene, 1-nitronaphtalene and
1,5-dinitronaphthalene.
The estimated concentration of the TNT in the samples varied
from 6 mg/kg to 450 000 mg/kg. The health hazards described
in literature for TNT and its degradation products, match
quite well with the symptoms described by the victims.
Marjatta Rautio Director of VERIFIN
Paula Vanninen Research Director of VERIFIN"
Appendix 2:
The text of the British Government's Letter to Baroness Cox
Regarding the testing of Damien Lewis's samples at the
Chemical and Biological Defence Agency, Porton Down
Ministry of Defence, Whitehall, London SW1A 2HB
From Baroness Symons Minister of State for Defence
Procurement
Reference D/MIN(DP)/ECS/13/3/3
5 June 2000
Dear Caroline
You wrote to me on 6 October about allegations that chemical
weapons had been used by Sudanese Government forces against
its internal opponents. I know that you have subsequently
pursued the matter in the House of Lords and that Baroness
Scotland has responded to a number of your points. I am
sorry that it has taken so long to reply but, as I am sure
you appreciate, on a question of such sensitivity we needed
to carry out very careful analysis of all the available
evidence.
First of all, I would like to assure you that the Government
treats very seriously all allegations that chemical weapons
have been used. As you know, the limited information
available from the reports of the incidents in Sudan last
July suggested that if chemical agents had been used, then
they were likely to have been arsenical "riot control
agents", ie chemicals that produce sensory irritation or
short-lived disabling physical effects. The initial analysis
carried out at CBD Porton of the samples provided by Damien
Lewis was therefore undertaken on the assumption that such
agents may have been involved. Given the lapse of time
between the alleged incident and the collection of the
samples, CBD assessed that no intact trace of such agents
would remain. Accordingly, tests were carried out only to
determine the presence of elemental arsenic. This was found
to be present but only in concentrations well below normal
background levels. Mr Lewis was then informed of these
results by CBD.
Although there was no clear evidence indicating the use of
chemical weapons, I concluded that, given the seriousness of
the allegations, further analysis should be carried out to
screen for chemical agents, their environmental degradation
products, and riot-control agents. This has now been
completed. The methods used involved gas and liquid
chromatography, combined with mass spectrometry for chemical
agents and riot control agents, and atomic absorption
spectrometry for arsenic. These techniques are also used in
carrying out analysis of samples to meet the requirements
adopted by the Organisation for the Prevention of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW). A total of 17 samples of water, soil, and
shrapnel collected from three sites in the Sudan were
analysed for the presence of known chemical agents, ie the
classical nerve agents, mustard, and other recognised
agents, for their environmental degradation products, and
for riot-control agents. They were also screened for the
presence of arsenic.
No intact CW agents, their associated environmental
degradation products, or riot-control agents were identified
in any of the samples. Low levels of arsenic were detected
in 15 of the samples, but, again, only at levels well below
expected natural limits for environmental samples.
Conventional TNT explosive was present in eight of the
samples, mainly those collected from near to the alleged
bomb craters or from presumed bomb fragments. CBD concluded
from its analysis that these samples bore no evidence of the
CW agents for which they had been tested. I enclose a copy
of the CBD report.
You may be aware that a separate set of samples taken from
the sites of the alleged CW attacks in the Sudan was tested
independently in the US. The results of these tests also
indicated no evidence of exposure to CW agents. I understand
that Mr Lewis also passed samples to the Finnish institute
responsible for chemical weapons verification ("VERIFIN")
and I am advised that this analysis likewise found evidence
of TNT but none for CW agents. Given the consistency of
results from these three independent sets of analysis, I
believe we must conclude that there is no evidence to
substantiate the allegations that chemical weapons were used
in these incidents in the Sudan.
The Government is informing OPCW and the Sudanese Government
of the results of the CBD analysis. I am also arranging for
a copy of my letter and the results of the CBD's analysis to
be passed on to Mr Lewis.
I am copying this letter to Baroness Scotland, Lord McNair,
Viscount Brentford and Lord Ahmed who took part in the
debate on the Sudan in the House of Lords on 13 October.
Yours ever
Liz
Notes
1 See, for example, 'Damien Lewis and Sudan: Questionable
Journalism on "Chemical Weapons"', published by MSANEWS, 30 July 2001 at
17:14:57.
2 See, 'U.S. Evidence of Terror Links to Blitzed Medicine Factory
Was "Totally Wrong"', Andrew Marshall, 'The Independent', London, 15
February 1999; 'No Trace of Nerve Gas Precursor Found at Bombed Sudan
Plant', 'Chemical & Engineering News', 15 February 1999.
3 'Clinton Bombed Civilians on Purpose. American Tests Showed No
Trace of Nerve Gas at "Deadly" Sudan Plant. The President Ordered the
Attack Anyway', 'The Observer', London, 23 August 1998. Front-page.
4 'Behind the Red Line: Political Repression in Sudan', published
by Human Rights Watch/Africa, New York, 1996, p.193.
5 See 'Sudan - A Country Study', available at the Library of
Congress web-site: see particularly, section on regionalism and
ethnicity.
6 'Sudan - Death in the Air', Phoenix Television, web-posted at
http://www.phoenix-tv.net/html/orange/recent/sudanche.htm
7 Peter Nyaba, 'The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan: An
Insider's View', Fountain Publishers, Kampala, 1997, pp.55, 66.
8 Andrew Boyd, 'Baroness Cox: A Voice for the Voiceless', Lion
Publishing, Oxford, 1998, p.324.
9 'The Times', (London), 30 January 2001, p.27.
10 House of Lords 'Official Report', 19 March 1998, cols. 818-820.
11 House of Lords 'Official Report', 19 March 1998, cols. 818-820.
12 Norwegian People's Aid, 'Confirmed Chemical Bombing in Southern
Sudan', 2 August 1999, posted on Relief Wet, www.reliefweb.int.
13 'Evaluation of Norwegian Humanitarian Assistance to the Sudan',
a report submitted to the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
COWI, Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, November 1997, p.27.
14 House of Lords 'Official Report', 31 October 2000, cols. WA81.
15 'Note for the Spokesman of the Secretary-General on Sudan', Note
delivered by the United Nations Resident Coordinator, Mr Philippe Borel,
to the Sudanese Foreign Ministry, 17 October 1999.
16 As published in 'The ASA Newsletter', Issue No. 79, 2000,
Applied Science and Analysis Inc, available at http://www.asanltr.com/ne
wsletter/00-4/sudan_verifin.htm
